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THE BROADDUS CASE

T

HE recent case of Broaddus v. Grout1 seems to have clarified

a much unsettled phase of the law of deeds in Texas. The case
concerns the adequacy of a description of property conveyed. Justices Wilson and Culver wrote separate dissenting opinions criticising both the result and the reasoning of the majority opinion. Particular conclusions of the majority are certainly surprising in the
light of previous cases involving similar descriptions, and the ultimate result is probably destined to arouse some comment among
the authorities in this field of the law.
The deed involved in the case was executed in Beaumont, Texas,
on June 11, 1937, and was acknowledged before a notary public
of Jefferson County. It was filed for record in Hardin County about
three months after its execution. Homer Vaughn and his wife, Lois
Vaughn, executed the deed as grantors with E. A. Grout as grantee.
Now, sixteen years later, Mr. Grout brought suit to quiet title and
to resolve an alleged ambiguity in the description within the deed
against Mrs. Lois Vaughn Broaddus, as grantor, who was, at the
time of the execution of the deed, Mrs. Lois Vaughn. The only important issue was whether or not the description in the deed was
sufficient to identify the property conveyed.
The deed was headed "The State of Texas, County of Jefferson,"
and then proceeded:
That I, Homer Vaughn, joined by my wife, Lois Vaughn, of the
County of Jefferson, State of Texas, do grant, sell and convey, unto the
said E. A. Grout of the County of Jefferson, State of Texas, our undivided interest amounting to 1/7th of the below described tract or parcel of land as follows:
Beginning at a stake in the west line of said 160-acre survey
1------------Tex
-------------258 S.W. 2d 308 (1953).
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172.8/11 varas from the northwest corner. Thence south with the west
line of said survey from corner 86.4/11 varas to a stake in the west
line of said survey from corner. Thence east 950 varas to east line
of said survey, stake for corner. Thence north with said east line
86.4/11 varas to south east of lot No. 2, thence west with said south
line of lot No. 2, 950 varas to place of beginning, containing 14.6/11
acres of land. Said land is undivided.
There were certain particulars concerning the description which
must be noted as pertinent to the present discussion. First, the description failed to designate the town, county, or state wherein the
tract of land was located. Secondly, the description did not indicate the name of the survey in which the tract was situated, nor did
it reveal the names of any adjoining surveys. However, in a more
favorable light as far as upholding the description is concerned, it
should be noted that .the grantors expressly said that they were
conveying "our undivided interest," and the enclosing boundaries
were clearly shown by a perfect metes and bounds description.
Lastly, though the residence of grantors was in Jefferson County
and though the deed was executed in Jefferson County, the fact that
the deed was put on record in Hardin County is vitally pertinent.
The above facts, plus those revealed by extrinsic evidence in the
trial court, formed the basis of the issues confronting the court.
In the trial court evidence was allowed to show that the grantor,
at the time of the execution of the deed, owned an undivided 1/7th
interest in a 14 6/11-acre tract which possessed the identical metes
and bounds description as did the property described in the deed.
This tract of land was Lot No. 3 out of the Isaac Gore 160-Acre
Survey in the 0. C. Nelson League in Hardin County, Texas. The
trial court held that the property described in the deed was one
and the same as Lot No. 3 of the Isaac Gore Survey in Hardin
County and that the description was sufficient, since extrinsic evidence indicated that the grantors owned no other tract of that particular acreage and metes and bounds description in any other
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state in the Union or any other county in Texas. The judgment of
the trial court was affirmed by the court of civil appeals.2
The majority of the supreme court, in an opinion written by
Justice Smedley, reversed and rendered judgment for the defendant, declaring the deed to be invalid and of no effect because the
description was insufficient. The majority recognized the rule of
Wilson v. Fisher" as the test in determining the sufficiency of a
description in both deeds and contracts to convey land, to-wit:
The writing must furnish within itselj, or by reference to some other
existing writing, the means or data by which the particular land to be
conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty. 4
The majority then proceeded to apply this test by saying that
the description in the case at bar furnished no "means or data"
by which the property described could be identified. The majority
also discussed a long line of Texas cases which hold a description
sufficient where it contains words to the effect that the grantor is
conveying his own property, this rule being clearly set out in the
language of Pickett v. Bishop,5 to-wit:
The settled rule in this state is that such a description, by reason of
the use in the memo or contract of such words as "my property," "my
land," or "owned by me," is sufficient when it is shown by extrinsic
evidence that the party to be charged and who has signed the contract
or memorandum, owns a tract and only one tract of land answering
the description in the memo.6
However, the court qualified this rule by construing it to apply
only when there is some other element of identification accompanying the recital of ownership, and the court pointed out that this
additional element was present in the Pickett case and other similar cases such as Sanderson v. Sanderson' because the counties
2253 S.W. 2d 74 (1952).
3 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W. 2d 150 (1945).
4 Id. at 56, 188 S.W. 2d at 152. Emphasis added.
5 148 Tex. 207, 223 S.W. 2d 222 (1949).
6 Id. at 208, 223 S.W. 2d at 223.
7130 Tex. 264, 109 S.W. 2d 744 (1937).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8

wherein the properties were situated were named in the descriptions. The majority concluded that such additional element is not
present where there is only a metes and bounds description without
naming the state, county or survey.
Justice Wilson wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, reasoning
that the Parol Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds' had no
application in the case and that a distinction should be made between "identifying" land in the instrument and "locating" land on
the ground. He concluded that there was no substantial difference
between locating "my" lands in a named county, as was done in
the Pickett and Sanderson cases, and locating the county and survey
in which lies a tract described by accurate metes and bounds, as
was done by the trial court and the court of civil appeals in this
case.
Justice Culver asserted that the additional element of identification referred to by the majority was present according to a line
of cases headed by Easterling v. Simmons.9 This case set forth
the rule:
The county in which the land so described is situated may be
inferred from the residence of the grantor, the place of acknowledgment, and the place o1 the filing and recording of the instrument,
where the grantor has property in such county to which the description given in the instrument is reasonably applicable. 10
Justice Culver pointed out that with the county and state clearly
established by inference from the recording of the instrument in
the county records, the case then fell squarely within the doctrine
expressed in the Pickett case.
The guides and tests for determining the sufficiency of a description in a deed are not made definite and certain by a review of the
cases. The terms applied by the courts in defining the guides are
8 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 3995.

9 293 S.W. 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) er. ref.
10Id. at 692. Emphasis added.
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often used loosely and ambiguously, and are usually susceptible
of more than one meaning. Jurisdictions other than Texas seem
to use the same guides as do the Texas courts, but frequently the
results are different. There is general agreement on the broad
principles which are the guide and standard in this realm of property law, and when a case can be decided by easy application of
these principles, the courts are almost uniform in their decisions.
However, when the cases become more involved and demand a
finer and more sensitive interpretation Qf these principles, then
the courts sometimes differ widely in their conclusions.
The long established and most frequently cited test in Texas
for determining the sufficiency of a description is the rule declared
by the supreme court in Wilson v. Fisher." This is the general test
followed in the majority of jurisdictions, although it is sometimes
expressed differently. For instance, the rule set out by Corpus
Juris Secundum is as follows:
In general, any description in a conveyance of property is sufficient
if it identifies the property, or if it affords the means of identification,
as by extrinsic evidence. 12
Many cases are cited in support of this." American Jurisprudence, citing another authority, 14 says the general rule is that the
land granted and intended to be conveyed must be described with
sufficient definiteness and certainty to locate and distinguish it
from other lands of the same kind. 5
All courts agree that a description will be upheld if by any reasonable rule of construction, aided by extrinsic evidence, it is at all
possible to identify the property intended.' The courts are reluctant to hold a deed void for insufficient description.
11 See quotation at note 4 supra.

26 C. J. S., Deeds, § 30, p. 210.
Including Krueger v. W. K. Ewing Co., 139 S.W. 2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
14 See Note, 123 A. L. R. 908 (1939).
15 16 AM. JUR., Deeds, § 260, p. 584.
12
13

16 4

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

(3d ed. 1939) 114.
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Where the description omits the name of the locality wherein
the property is situated, the rule generally applied in Texas is
well stated by Texas Jurisprudence:
It is a well settled proposition that, if a deed furnishes other sufficient means of identifying the property conveyed, it is not invalid
the survey or town, county or state wherein
because it fails to state
17
the land it situated.
Undoubtedly, this is the rule elsewhere, as noted in an outstanding
treatise, 8 where it it said that although the name of the state,
county, or town in which the property is located is omitted, title
may nevertheless pass where the deed recites other descriptive
particulars and provides other means of identification. 9
Thus, in the deed in the principal case, if the description is to
be held sufficient, some other means of identification must be
found, unless the county and state can be inferred in some way.
In determining what are "other means of identification" and
to what extent extrinsic and parol evidence is admissible, the
courts frequently differ. For instance, many courts state that parol
evidence may not be used to identify the property where there is
within the description a patent ambiguity but that parol evidence
may be used where there is a latent ambiguity in the description.
A patent ambiguity is defined as an ambiguity that appears on the
face of the instrument, while a latent ambiguity is defined as one
that appears in applying the description to the ground.2"
However, these definitions by no means limit the courts in the
admission of parol evidence, but seem merely to be used as a
justification for refusing or allowing the evidence. This is done
in a great many cases where the county, state or town (or other
subdivision) has not been designated. For instance, a great many
17 14 TEX. JuR., Deeds, § 212, pp. 1100, 1002. See, e.g., Miller v. Hodges, 260 S.W.
168, 170 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
18 6 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (Perm. ed. 1940) § 3265.
19 And see Comment, 25 Ore. L. Rev. 195 (1946).
20 Norris v. Hunt, 51 Tex. 609, 614 (1879).
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Texas cases, beginning with Norris v. Hunt,2 ' determine the sufficiency of descriptions where the locality has not been designated
by distinguishing between patent and latent ambiguities. American Law Reports discusses the problem of patent and latent ambiguity thoroughly and concludes that no matter what language is
used, the majority of the courts follow the rule that "where there
is a description in the deed or mortgage sufficient to point out with
some definiteness the land intended to be conveyed, the fact that
there is a failure to designate town or township or range, etc., does
not vitiate the instrument, and parol evidence is admissible to
identify the land."2 2
The terms "locating" and "identifying" are often confused. Justice Wilson made the following distinction:
Thus the word identify is used to mean segregate and enclose a
locate is
definite tract from immediate surrounding land. The word
28
used to mean that which takes a searcher to that tract.
All the cases seem to make some similar distinction although frequently these terms are used interchangeably.
Most courts consider the identity of the land the thing that must
be revealed by the written instrument, and then, once the identity
has been established, the land may be located on the ground by
extrinsic evidence. Bates v. Harris,4 a Kentucky case, uses the following language:
Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to identify the property which
the parties had in mind when making the contract, as the writing must
identify it when read in the light of the facts; but the extrinsic parol
evidence is admissible to designate the property which has been identified in the minds of the parties as expressed in the writing.
The Kentucky court merely used the word "designate" in lieu
of the word "locate." This distinction is often explained by use of
21 Id. at 614, 615.
22
23
24

See Note, 68 A. L. R. 4, 96 (1929).
258 S. W. 2d at 314.
144 Ky. 399, 138 S.W. 276, 36 L. R. A. (n.s.) 154 (1911).
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the words "apply" and "supply." For illustration, it is said that
an omission of the county, state, and city, town or village wherein
the property is located renders the writing insufficient when it contains nothing from which the omitted statements may be inferred
and extrinsic evidence is necessary for the purpose of supplying,
as distinguished from applying, the description.25
The courts have consistently applied the same tests in determining the sufficiency of description in contracts to convey as they
have in determining the sufficiency of deeds of conveyance. This
point was made in Justice Wilson's dissent, 6 and he probably was
correct in stating that the tests have become rules of property in
Texas. There is an obvious justification for a distinction because
two different statutes, the Statute of Frauds27 and the Statute of
Conveyances,28 are involved. But it appears that the courts have
emphasized the determination of the problem of whether there is
sufficient description from the standpoint of the intention of the
parties to the instrument, as is done in all contracts including contracts to convey land, rather than from the standpoint of whether
third parties are adequately put on notice of the precise tract of
land conveyed.29 Texas Jurisprudence says that when the court, by
placing itself in the situation of the parties, can ascertain what
they meant, and the land referred to can be identified, then there
is no patent ambiguity."
Indeed, the case from which the majority derived their test for
determining the sufficiency of a description involved a contract to
convey.81 Every case they cited, 2 except Carter & Brothers v.
25 27 C. J., Deeds, § 321, p. 273.
26 258 S. W. 2d at 211-213.
27 Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 3995.
28 Tnx. REV. CfV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1292.
29 Davis v. Duncan, 102 S. W. 2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) er. dism.
20 14 TFX. JuR., Deeds, § 207, pp. 995, 996.
31 Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 54, 188 S. W. 2d 152, 153 (1945).
32 Hoover v. Wukasch -.........
Tex-------------254 S.W. 2d 507 (1953) ; Phillips v. Burns,
-----------Tex -------.....
, 252 S.W. 2d 927 (1952); Pickett v. Bishop, cited supra note 5;
Sanderson v. Sanderson, 130 Tex. 264, 109 S.W. 2d 744 (1937).
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Ewers,3 involved a contract to convey rather than a deed of conveyance. One of the few jurisdictions that make a distinction between a conveyance and a contract to convey is California. The
recent case of United Truckmen, Inc., v. Lorentz 4 quotes the California Supreme Court case of Johnson v. Schimpf 5 to the following effect:
It is now the general and well established rule that less strictness
in the description of property is demanded in a contract than in a deed
36
of conveyance.
The opinion goes on to say that the courts have been most liberal
with the construction of contracts and will do all that they can to
give effect to the intention of the parties.
This distinction, as adopted by California, has been criticised
by Burby, who says that the test of sufficiency of description in a
contract and in a deed should be the same." In one California
case, Preble v. Abrahams,8 the description in a contract to convey
was "forty acres of the eighty-acre tract at Biggs." The Supreme
Court of California allowed parol evidence to show the particular
forty acres intended by the parties. This holding was justified by
the court in the United Truckmen case because of the fact that a
contract instead of a deed was involved. 9
This result is, of course, contrary to the rule of the majority of
jurisdictions, including Texas.4" Most courts, in cases involving
either deeds or contracts to convey, seek to ascertain what property
the parties intended to convey rather than whether a third party
would be put on notice by the bare instrument itself. In the Broaddus case the majority based their reasoning, at least in part, on the
-9 133 Tex. 616, 131 S.W. 2d 86 (1939).
34 114 Cal. App. 2d 26, 249 P. 2d 352 (1952).
3- 197 Cal. 43, 239 Pac. 401 (1925).
36 Id. at 48, 239 Pac. at 403.
37 BURBY, REAL PROPERTY (Perm. ed. 1943) § 275, p. 414.
38 88 Cal. 245, 27 Pac. 99 (1891).
39 249 P. 2d at 357.
40 14 TEX. JUR., Deeds, § 208, p. 996.
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idea that a third party would not be put on notice. This reliance is
subject to criticism. Justice Wilson recognized this:
The opinion is not bottomed upon the proposition that the parties
themselves did not have a meeting of the minds to a common intent
but rather upon the proposition that the deed 41
itself is not sufficiently
definite to serve notice upon the third parties.
Consideration should be given four possible means of identification of land where state, county, town or other subdivision is
not mentioned. They are:
(1) Identification by the use of a locally known name such as
the "Old Whipple Place."
(2) Identification by reference to natural objects, such as rivers,
mountains, etc.
(3) The doctrine of the Pickett case.
(4) The rule anounced in Easterling v. Simmons, supra.
There are other means of identification where the locality is not
designated, such as by reference to another writing, but these
methods are not pertinent here. The first two will be discussed
briefly because. many of the decisions cited by the majority and
by Justice Wilson can be justified by one of these two methods.
The first two means are closely related to the doctrine of the
Pickett case. Phillips v. Burns4 2 explains the first method of designation. The supreme court was confronted with the question of the
sufficiency of a description which, after designating the county
and state, described the property as "The Old Whipple Place together with several tracts adjoining it...." The court held that the
description would have been sufficient had the phrase, "several
tracts of land adjoining it," not been added because the designa.
tion of the farm as the "Old Whipple Place" was sufficient to
identify the property. Arthur v. Ridge4 is another example of a
41 258 S.W. 2d at 313.
42 -----..----Tex ----------252 S. W. 2d 927 (1952).
43 89 S.W. 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) er. ref.
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description which was held sufficient where the deed excepted from
a tract "the old place on Bear Creek." The court held that the
designation was sufficient to identify the property excepted, even
though there was no reference to the state or the county wherein
the property described was located.
Many other cases uphold designations by familiar names (e.g.,
"Snow Farm"" and "Knapp home property" 4 5 ). However, this
result is not usually reached unless there is either a designation
of the county and state or a recital of ownership in addition to the
designation by a locally known name. In the Phillips case there
was a designation of the country and state, and in Arthur v. Ridge
there was a recital of ownership. The first two methods of describing a tract are well discussed in Wilson v. Calhoun.4 6 The case
involved a written mortgage that described the property as the
"Redmon Farm," bounded on the south by the "Hiwassee" (river)
and "at present belonging to W. D. Calhoun," who was the grantor.
There was no reference to town, county or state, but the Supreme
Court of Tennessee held the description to be sufficient. The designation of the property as the "Redmon Farm" was accompanied
by a recital of ownership and a reference to a natural object, and
thus sufficiently identified the property.
References to natural objects are always sufficient when accompanied
by a recital of whose property is conveyed, because most
courts will
take judicial notice of the location of natural
objects.4 7
The third, and fourth means of identification mentioned above
were directly in question in the principal case. The doctrine pronounced in the Pickett case is nothing new. It has been followed
in almost every jurisdiction and dates back many years. In the
Pickett case a memorandum described the property as "my prop44 Iollis v. Burgess, 37 Kan. 487, 15 Pac. 536 (1887).
4, Toodenow v. Curtis, 18 Mich. 298 (1869).
46 157 Tenn. 667, 11 S.W. 2d 906 (1928).
47 See cases cited supra notes 2 and 9; Slater v. Breese, 36 Mich. 77 (1877)

(location of "River Tiffin" judicially noticed).
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erty described on the opposite side hereof," and on the reverse
side there appeared "20.709 acres out of John Stephens 640-acre
survey in Tarrant County, Texas."'"
A flagrant violation of the rule requiring definite description
occurs where an undescribed tract is conveyed out of a larger
tract. Even though the larger tract may be accurately described,
it is consistently held that the designation of the smaller tract is
insufficient. Texas Jurisprudence says that this is the type of case
in which the courts most frequently hold the description to be insufficient.49 However, the supreme court held that the description
in the Pickett case was sufficient, declaring that where there is a
recital of ownership, extrinsic evidence will be allowed to show
whether or not the grantor owns only one tract fitting the description within the deed. If this can be shown, the description is
sufficient.
In Adams v. Abbott5" the description was, "my farm in
Collin County, Texas," and this was held sufficient because extrinsic evidence indicated the grantor owned only one farm in Collin
County. In the Sanderson case, supra, the grantor conveyed a tract
known as "Mrs. Kelton's farm in Haskell County." The court held
that the description was sufficiently definite if it could be shown
that Mrs. Kelton owned only one farm in Haskell County.
In Wilson v. Fisher, supra, the two contracts in question described the property by street address without specifying the town,
county or state. However, the court indicated that the description
would have been sufficient despite the absence of designation of
the locality if there had been a definite recitation that the grantor
was conveying "his" land.
Morrison v. Dailey5 specifically held that where the grantor de48

148 Tex. at 207, 223 S.W. 2d at 223.

49 14 TEX. Jun., Deeds, § 208, p. 996.

254 S.W. 2d 78 (1952).
Tex --------------------51 6 S.W. 426 (Tex. 1887).
50
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scribed the property as "my place, known as 'the James Berry
Tract of Land'," the description was sufficient even though there
was no reference to the state or county of its location. The recitation of "my place" made admissible extrinsic evidence to show
that the grantor owned only one tract known as the "James Berry
Tract of Land." Thus, the county and state wherein the tract was
situated could be ascertained.
The principle of the cases above discussed has been adopted
in most jurisdictions. A learned author has said:
In a number of other cases the court has referred to the fact of
ownership by the grantor of particular land as tending to show that
the conveyance, otherwise lacking
in definiteness of description, was
52
intended to apply to that land.
As another example, Coleman v. White5" held that two instruments describing the property as "lot and house in square 98"
and "my house and lot" were sufficient without reference to the
county or state.
A reference to ownership within a description is a powerful
element in producing a sufficient description. One may conclude:
(1) Where reference to ownership is accompanied by a designation of the county, the description will be sufficient
despite the fact that other defects appear, provided extrinsic evidence shows that the grantor owned no other similar
tract within the locality.
(2) Where a reference to ownership is accompanied by a
designation of the property by a familiar name or by a
reference to a natural object, the description again will be
sufficient despite the absence of designation of town, county
and state, provided extrinsic evidence shows that the grantor owned no other tract with a similar name or near the
natural object referred to.
52 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

53 50 So. 2d 715 (Miss. 1951).

(3d ed. 1939) 117.
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In the principal case a definite reference to ownership by the grantor was accompanied by a metes and bounds description, and the
majority concluded that to hold this description sufficient was
going one step too far even though extrinsic evidence indicated
that the grantor owned only one tract fitting the description.
The majority may well have "drawn the line" at a proper place.
There must be a limit somewhere to the indefiniteness of descriptions in deeds, or else the Statute of Conveyances has failed in its
purpose. However, the court seems to have departed from the
reasoning of prior cases by indicating that the principle upon
which sufficiency is determined is whether or not a third person
would be put on notice as to what property was conveyed by the
deed. Heretofore the cases have demonstrated a definite tendency
to follow the contract principle that the description must reasonably identify the property the parties intended to convey. If the
description is required to be so definite that a third person will
have complete notice, it would seem that a deed will have to
describe the property in a manner such that no extrinsic evidence
will be necessary either to identify or to locate the property
conveyed.
Justice Wilson asked in his dissent:
Is there a substantial difference between locating "my" property in
a named county and locating the county and survey in which lies a
tract described by accurate metes and bounds? 54
If there is, the reasoning underlying the holding in cases like
Morrison v. Dailey, supra, is now impliedly overruled.
The last means of identification, where the county and state are
not expressly named within the description, is derived from the
rule announced in Easterling v. Simmons, supra. The failure of
the majority opinion to discuss this rule is hard to understand.
Simply stated, the rule is: "The county of location of the land may
'4 258

S.W. 2d at 314.
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also be inferred from the residence of the grantor, the place of
acknowledgment, and the place of filing and recording the instrument. . .. ""
In the Easterling case the deed was acknowledged in Navarro
County, stated that the grantors lived in Navarro County, and was
recorded in Navarro County. The court held that these facts were
sufficient for an inference that the property was located in Navarro
County. The description had failed to designate the county and
state but did provide an accurate metes and bounds description.
In the Broaddus case the deed was recorded in Hardin County
where the property was located, but the acknowledgment was
shown to have been taken in Jefferson County. (The residence of
the grantors was also in Jefferson County.) Justice Culver, however, seemed to think that the fact that the deed was recorded in
Hardin County was alone sufficient for an inference that the property was located in Hardin County. The Easterling case and other
cases in Texas, as well as authority elsewhere, seemed to justify
such reasoning.
In Davis v. Duncan56 a quitclaim deed failed to name the
county, state or survey in which the land was located, but the court
held the description sufficient. One of the circumstances influencing the court was the place of recordation:
The deed was promptly recorded in Leon county, which is a circumstance to show that the vendee understood that it conveyed land
situated in that county.5 7Under these circumstances we think the description was sufficient.
The thinking of the court was along the line of determining sufficiency by ascertaining the intention of the parties to the deed,
rather than along the line of ascertaining whether or not the
description gave full notice to third parties.
14 Tax. JuR., Deeds, § 212, p. 1002.
56 102 S.W. 2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) er. dism.
57 Id. at 288, 289.
55
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Other cases support the rule of the Easterling case. For instance, in Miller v. Hddges" no county, town or state was designated in a deed, but the instrument was filed for record in Palo
Pinto County. The court held that it could infer that the property
was located in Palo Pinto County because:
The courts of other states have held that location of land may be
inferred from the residence of the grantor, the place of acknowledg-

ment, and the place of filing and recording of the instrument, when
these are5 9 consistent with the true facts as to ownership of the
property.
In Langham v. Gray6" the court inferred the county from the
facts that the dateline on a deed indicated that it was executed in
"Beaumont, Texas," and recital was made that both grantor and
grantee were citizens of such county. In Goggans v. Green61 the
court held that a description in a sheriff's deed was sufficient even
though it designated no state or county because the county could
he inferred from a recitation of the residence of the sheriff.
Most other jurisdictions are in line with the Easterling case. In
Louisiana the case of Harrill v. Pitts62 leaves no doubt on the matter. The court said that the circumstances that a deed showed the
place of residence of the vendee and was acknowledged and
recorded in the vendee's parish could be considered in determining the location of the property, where the state and parish had
been omitted from the description. A learned author states:
A deed may be valid even though it fails to specify the state and
county in which the land is located, where the description given corresponds with that of the grantor's 63land in the county in which the
deed is acknowledged and recorded.
Holly's Executor v. Curry" demonstrated the West Virginia court's
58

260 S.W. 168 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).

.9 260 S.W. at 170.

60227 S.W. 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
61 165 S.W. 2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
62 194 La. 123, 193 So. 562 (1940).
63 6 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (Perm. ed. 1940) § 3265, p. 429.
64 58 W. Va. 70, 51 S.E. 135 (1905).
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approval of the Easterling rule when the county and state of the
property conveyed were inferred from the fact that the deed "was
acknowledged and recorded in Lincoln County."
The Oregon view is said to be that when a doubtful description
is to be construed, the court should endeavor to assume the position of the parties, and the circumstances of the transaction should
be carefully considered.65 In applying this rule, the Oregon court
held that the county and state could be inferred from the fact that
the land contract was dated at "Woodburn, Oregon."66
There are cases that clearly indicate that where only one of the
circumstances in the Easterling case is present, the court may still
infer the county in which the property is located. In Calton v.
Lewis67 the county was inferred from the mere fact that the deed
was acknowledged in "Lawrence County, Tennessee." An Illinois
case, Garden City Sand Co. v. Miller,6" held similarly.
A Michigan case is very similar to the Broaddus case. In Mee v.
Benedict69 an instrument purporting to convey standing timber
omitted the state and county where the timber was located. The
deed was acknowledged in Chicago but was recorded in the county
wherein the timber was located. The court said, referring to the
bare circumstance that the instrument was recorded in the county
where the timber was, "This we think sufficient evidence to
identify the lands sought to be described.""
In Gex v. Dill" the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the
omission to name the state or county in which the lands lay, did
not make a deed incompetent where the lands were found to be
Comment, 25 Ore. L. Rev. 192, 196 (1946).
Bogard v. Barham, 52 Ore. 121, 124, 96 Pac. 673, 674 (1908).
67 199 Ind. 181, 21 N.E. 475 (1889).
68 157 Il. 225, 41 N.E. 753 (1895).
69 98 Mich. 260, 57 N.W. 175 (1893).
70 Id. at 266, 57 N.W. at 178.
7186 Miss. 10, 38 So. 193 (1905).
65
66
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in the county where the instrument was executed, acknowledged,
and placed on record.
Whether the Supreme Court of Texas, through the majority
opinion in the Broaddus case, impliedly rejected all the authority
just noted cannot be ascertained, since the rule in the Easterling
case was not even discussed.
Justice Culver seemed to present the best solution to the problem in the Broaddus case. He contended that the doctrine of the
Pickett case should be complemented by the rule in the Easterling
case, that is to say, the state and county should be inferzed from
the fact that the deed was recorded in Hardin County. When this
is done, the Pickett doctrine may be applied, since there was a recitation of ownership by the grantor within the deed and extrinsic
evidence in the trial court revealed that the grantor owned no other
property of this metes and bounds description elsewhere in the
United States.
The propriety of combining two such rules of property may be
questioned, since weird results may eventuate in some situations.
But, as observed by Justice Wilson,72 the courts are continually
retreating from the formalism of the early English common law,
so that many rules of property are applied elastically, especially
where this is necessary to accomplish justice.
True, the line must be drawn somewhere, but was it properly
drawn by the majority in the principal case? The deed had been
on record in Hardin County for seventeen years, and during that
time no question had been raised as to its validity." By inadvertence the names of the county and state and survey in which the
land was situated were omitted. Now the grantor succeeded in
having the deed declared void in a suit by the grantee to quiet title.
No third party intervened. In effect, the suit was between the
S.W. 2d at 314.
258 S.W. 2d at 315.

72 258
73
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original grantee and grantor. There seems to have been no doubt
as to the property actually intended to be conveyed by grantor to
grantee, and this common intention was manifested by the actions
and words of the parties at the time the deed was executed. It may
be that the supreme court is revealing an intention to construe
descriptions with more formality and strictness hereafter. The
court may feel that the Statute of Conveyances is not fulfilling the
purpose for which it was passed, and that henceforward descriptions in deeds should be more definite than descriptions in contracts to convey, or, possibly, that they both should be more definite. The new standard may be one which puts third parties fully
on notice, rather than one which manifests the common intention
of the parties.
There is a policy to support a stricter standard. But if the Texas
Supreme Court adopts it, the court will be going against the trend
of authority. The trend is not a recent one but has firm support in
the American common law and promotes the following policy:
The sole purpose of a description of land, as contained in a deed
of conveyance, being to identify the subject matter of the grant, a deed
will not be declared void for uncertainty if it is possible, by any reasonable rules of construction, to ascertain from the description, aided
by extrinsic evidence, what property it is intended to convey. .... 74
Benton Musslewhite.

74 8 R. C. L., Deeds, § 129, p. 1074.

